FAILURES
By
William L. R. Rice
Over the years, my career path was
strewn with failures caused by others. While they were not of my
own making, they often had a profound effect on my own career
choices. Some of these failures may be of interest to the
reader.
In March of 1955 I published my
graduate thesis for the USAF Institute of Technology (USAFIT). It
was entitled, “Cation Adsorption on Clay Surfaces”. I had studied
the adsorption of ionized lanthanum on montmorillonite clay. The
study related to the possibility of using clays to decontaminate
nuclear reactor waste products, followed by firing of the clay to make
an impervious body for long term waste disposal. At that time
disposal of radioactive waste was recognized by the industry as a
serious impediment to the use of nuclear power. Although nearly a
half-century has now passed, the US still does not have a permanent
site for disposal of radioactive waste. The Yucca Mountain
facility in Nevada is proposed as a disposal site, but is found
objectionable by many. So the Government has thus far failed in
its statutory responsibility to provide a waste disposal site for the
nuclear industry.
Following graduation from USAFIT,
I was assigned to the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion (ANP) program.
I managed research contracts to develop radiation resistant fluids and
lubricants for use in the nuclear bomber. The ANP program never
succeeded, because it was not possible to develop materials capable of
withstanding the high temperature and intense nuclear radiation
environment of a nuclear propulsion system. Yet proponents
managed to drag the program out for many years. It took a direct
order by President John F. Kennedy in 1963 to terminate the
program. So this $2 billion program failed. (Although there
was no longer an end use, my modest program did find organic compounds
with resistance to high temperature and nuclear radiation [e.g.
bis(m-phenoxyphenyl) ether].)
I joined the US Atomic Energy
Commission in 1959 and managed research on high temperature nuclear
fuels and materials. During my early years in this capacity, I
was on occasion quite critical of the ANP program, which was still in
existence. Shortly after President Kennedy terminated the
program, my Branch Chief called me into his office and said with a big
smile that he had an additional job for me. With the demise of
ANP, it was decided that the high temperature refractory materials
effort at GE in Cincinnati was to continue for several years, with an
annual budget of about $6 million. This would allow completion of
the ongoing research. I was assigned responsibility for
Headquarters management of the effort! I learned at this point
that being critical can sometimes backfire. This follow-on
research was very successful, but was also classified. Hence the
public had no ready access to the technical results.
One of my responsibilities during
this period was to chair the AEC’s High Temperature Fuels Committee,
where I placed strong emphasis on the reporting of failure. The
most effective way to learn about new fuels is to test them to failure,
to learn use limitations. So when the Committee met, I would
emphasize the importance of good reporting on failures. In fact,
I instituted an award for the best report. At the end of the
three-day meeting, I would announce the winner, who then received a
bottle of Virginia wine. The expense was minor, but the
competition to receive this award became intense!
After various assignments, I
joined the Division of Controlled Thermonuclear Research in 1972.
This Division was responsible for developing a successful fusion
reactor for generation of power. The fusion energy program began
in the early 1950’s, with the stated purpose of attaining controlled
fusion energy in 20 years. For 50 years, success has always
been in the future. In fact, fusion experts now talk about
operating a demonstration fusion power plant in about 35 years, to
enable the commercialization of fusion power. It would appear
that with each year that passes, the goal now slips further into the
future!
Although progress in the fusion
program was limited in the early 1970’s, we actually convinced the
Congressional oversight committees to provide increased funding each
year. The technical criteria for fusion energy success were
presented to the oversight committees on semi-logarithmic paper, which
non-technical members of Congress were unlikely to understand!
What looked like nearness to success on the graphs was no such thing.
The technical data were simply being extrapolated to the next decade on
the log scale and success was still a long way off. But the
members of the committees were impressed and thought that progress was
significant! Despite the expenditure of hundreds of millions of
dollars, the program thus far has failed to meet its original goals.
Shortly after I left the Division,
an avoidable management failure occurred. My former secretary
came to me and told me that she had been asked to resign by her new
boss, solely because she was pregnant. I was amazed by this
action and told her to seek guidance from the Director of
Personnel. As a result, she was reassigned within the Division
with no loss of status and the Division Director had an intense
closed-door training session with the Personnel Director.
The Atomic Energy Commission was
abolished and programs were transferred to the Energy Research and
Development Administration (ERDA) on January 19, 1975. I claim no
responsibility for the termination of the AEC, but I did manage the
farewell party. It was held at the Bureau of Standards cafeteria
in Germantown, MD, and was attended by thousands. As one
benchmark, the group consumed 80 gallons of hard liquor at the four
open bars. The party was a success and only one attendee was
arrested for drunkenness!
In 1975 I became an Assistant
Director of the ERDA Office of Congressional Rela-tions. My
subject areas included solar, geothermal and fusion energy. One
notable failure in this period was the solar energy program. The
Government provided major funding to support a residential and
commercial solar heating program. Congress also provided tax
credits to induce the use of solar systems. The credits
diminished with time, and when they disappeared, so did the solar
industry. Hence, the solar energy program ultimately failed
without the artificial financial supports that had been provided.
(As I write this, I understand that wind energy appears to have finally
become a financially competitive technology).
On a number of occasions,
members of Congress were asked by constituents where one could best
earn a Masters degree in solar energy. When such inquiries were
forwarded to me, I told the constituent to work instead toward a
Masters in Mechanical Engineering, and take electives related to solar
energy. I said that solar energy was not a field with a bright
future and they were better off earning a more basic engineering
degree. Time proved me right!
ERDA was abolished September 30,
1977, and the Department of Energy was established. I served for
a brief time in the geothermal energy program, and then transferred to
the uranium enrichment program in 1980. I ultimately became
responsible for managing development of the Advanced Gas Centrifuge
(AGC) for uranium enrichment. This was a short-lived
responsibility. A decision was made in 1985 to establish a
selection committee, responsible for picking the next generation
technology for enrichment. AGC was competed against the process
called Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (AVLIS). A $2
billion gas centrifuge plant had already been built in southern Ohio,
so a technology that existed was compared with a technology that merely
looked good on paper. However, key members of the selection
committee had previously managed AVLIS technologies, so the outcome was
preordained. AGC lost, and the existing centrifuge facility was
dismantled. AVLIS won, yet was never built and never proved what
it could do. So the enrichment program suffered a major failure
of purpose. At this point, I had enough. I had always
enjoyed working with young people, and decided to explore how I could
become a high school Physics teacher. This became possible in the
fall of 1986, so I retired from Government after a 33 year career.
In my new capacity as a teacher, I
observed some unique failures in the field of education. The most
notable related to a study of student self esteem. An educator in
the Superintendent’s office initiated a program to promote student self
esteem. This was conducted in a middle school that sent students
on to my high school. The heart of the process was to never give
a failing grade of “F”. Instead, the student would receive a
grade of “IP”, meaning “In Progress”. The outcome of this study
was creation of a student body that had exceedingly high self esteem,
but very poor study habits. Their rude awakening occurred when
they entered high school and began to receive failing grades.
Their self esteem was demolished and they were left floundering.
My colleagues told me that they could spot these students within the
first week, and could project that they would do poorly. From
this example, and others, I learned to suspect the quality of a PhD in
Education!
So, what did I learn about failure
during my working days? I learned the obvious, that deliberate
failures are recognized as sound engineering, for they define system
limitations. I learned that concealing a lack of progress or
hiding unexpected failures will ultimately backfire. This can
lead to project cancellation and/or the firing of persons
involved. And finally, I learned that management failures are
inexcusable. They indicate poor management skills and reflect
back on the perpetrator. Such failures can only hurt one's career.
Despite the above, both of my
careers were time well spent. With but one exception (a year
spent in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission), every one of my
assignments was productive and enjoyable. I can only hope that
other members of the Class of 1953 have had such varied and interesting
careers!